Bitcoin mining is becoming an increasingly energy-intensive process 1,2,3 whose future implications for energy use and CO2 emissions remain poorly understood. This is in part because-like many IT systems-its computational efficiencies and service demands have been evolving rapidly. Therefore, scenario analyses that explore these implications can fill pressing knowledge gaps, but they must be approached with care. History has shown that poorly constructed scenarios of future IT energy useoften due to overly-simplistic extrapolations of early rapid growth trends-can do more harm than good by spreading misinformation and driving ill-informed decisions. 4,5,6 Indeed, the utility of an energy demand scenario is directly proportional to its credibility, which is typically demonstrated through careful attention to technology characteristics and evolution, analytical rigor and transparency, and designing scenarios that align with plausible future outcomes.
of 40 "broadly used" technologies whose social utilities vary widely and bear little resemblance to that of Bitcoin. The authors never explain why such comparisons are valid, nor do they justify the plausibility of the very abrupt changes in Bitcoin transaction levels and growth trajectories associated with their resulting scenarios. Hence, these scenarios should not be taken seriously.
Third, Mora et al. applied outdated values for mining rig efficiencies and electric power carbon intensities, which inflated their estimated 2017 Bitcoin energy use and CO2 emissions values considerably. When estimating the direct electricity use of Bitcoin mining, the authors erroneously included many old and inefficient rigs in their selection pool that were no longer economically viable in 2017 ( Supplementary Fig 5) , betraying a lack of understanding of current mining equipment and economics. Furthermore, Mora et al provided equal weighting when selecting a rig from their pool as the sole rig type to mine a block, thus over-representing slower inefficient rigs and creating scenarios that require physically impossible rig counts. When we excluded unprofitable rigs in our replicated analysis, Mora et al.'s model produced an estimate of 28 TWh in 2017 ( Supplementary Fig 6) , which is one fourth of their original estimate of 114 TWh. Furthermore, they applied 2014 carbon intensities (g CO2/kWh) to calculate 2017 emissions, ignoring non-negligible grid decarbonization improvements in the intervening years ( Supplementary Fig 7) , 9 even though sufficient data existed at the time of their study for reasonable estimates of 2017 carbon intensities. 10 Supplementary Fig 7) . This dubious choice ignores the dynamic natures of mining rig and power grid technologies and violates the widely-followed practice of accounting for technological change in forward-looking energy technology scenarios. In acknowledging their static grid intensity assumption, they point to at least one reference containing credible grid intensity outlooks 10 but failed to utilize them. Estimating the future energy efficiency of mining is certainly difficult, but the authors never explain why they simply ignored this important scenario consideration, nor do they justify how assuming static mining efficiency for 100 years-when mining rigs have evolved monthly 1 -can lead to any useful insights.
Fifth, in constructing their slow, median, and fast adoption scenarios, Mora et al. committed key errors when analyzing adoption rates within their 40-product comparison pool. 12 Namely, when replicating their analysis, we discovered that, for many comparison products, they designated the first available data point as the first year of product usage. For example, the authors designate the first year of usage for electric power as 1908, at which point U.S. household adoption had climbed to 10% (Mora et al. Fig.   1b ). Yet Thomas Edison began offering electric power to (far fewer) U.S. households in Manhattan in 1882, over two decades earlier. 13 By omitting the initial low-adoption years of US market availability for numerous technologies, their scenarios were biased toward inaccurately steep near-term adoption trajectories in all three cases. When we replicated their analysis using more reasonable estimates of the first year of technology usage, their own methods produced slower adoption curves, particularly in the median and slow growth scenarios ( Supplementary Fig 8) .
To assess how these last three analytical flaws affected Mora et al.'s projections, we replicated their original scenario analysis (Fig 1a) , and then applied reasonable corrections in stepwise fashion. We first applied the 2017 per-transaction Bitcoin carbon intensity we obtained by excluding unprofitable rigs ( Fig   1b) . We then utilized weighted-average grid intensities based on mining locations assumed by the authors, including grid intensity evolution based on IEA outlooks that reflect current and announced national power policies in mining locations ( Supplementary Fig 7) (Fig 1c) . Finally, we applied our calculated adoption curves in all three scenarios (Fig 1d) .
The results show that, had the authors avoided the key errors we described above, their own study design would have yielded much different, and far less alarming, projections of future Bitcoin carbon emissions. That said, we find the study design itself sufficiently flawed-e.g., use of transactions as driver, comparisons to 40 unrelated technologies, ignoring rig evolution-that such corrections alone are not enough to salvage the authors' approach. On these bases, we argue that the Mora et al.
scenarios are fundamentally flawed and should not be taken seriously by researchers, policymakers, or the public. In this document we show that the analysis by Mora et al., which predicts that Bitcoin mining alone can increase global warming by more than 2 C in 11 to 22 years, is fundamentally flawed and should not be taken seriously by researchers, policymakers, or the general public.
Hereafter we refer to Mora et al. as "the authors." We first document our replication of the authors' original methods and results in Sections I, II, and III, elaborating on several methodological problems we encountered during the process. Next, in Sections IV-VIII, we discuss in depth five major flaws related to the authors' study design and execution. As part of these discussions, we apply our replicated model to demonstrate that, had the authors avoided some key analytical errors, their own model would have produced significantly lower carbon emissions trajectories that invalidate their original alarmist predictions.
I. Replication of 2017 CO2 emissions estimate
We first replicated the authors' 2017 Bitcoin CO2 emissions estimate, based on the R script they provided as their model. We generalize their calculation approach as follows (using our own notation):
The variable C2017 is Bitcoin's global carbon emissions quantity in 2017, expressed in units of grams of CO2 equivalents (g CO2e). Ei is the energy efficiency of the mining rig assigned to solve block i, expressed in units of joules of direct electricity use per hash (J/H). The authors assign rigs randomly (i.e., with equal probability) to each block from a list they provide in their Supplementary Information (SI) Table 1 . Hi is the expected number of hashes required to solve block i, which is calculated by multiplying its difficulty by 2 32 . Gi is the regional CO2 intensity of grid electricity generation (g CO2e/kWh), which the authors assign depending on which pool solved block I as documented in their SI Table 2 . The denominator 2 converts direct electricity use from joules into kWh (1 kWh = 3.6*10 6 joules). The results are summed over n = 55,864 blocks, the total number solved in 2017.
Our replication of the authors' code generated an expected 2017 global Bitcoin CO2 emissions value (C2017) of 69 Mt CO2e (18.8 Mt C), which is identical to the authors' result, and an expected 2017 global Bitcoin direct electricity use value of 114 TWh. The latter value was not reported by the authors.
II. Replication of future CO2 emissions projections
Next we attempted to replicate the authors' future projections of Bitcoin CO2 emissions. The authors did not provide code or explicit formulae for replicating their projections. Therefore, we had to rely on the authors' qualitative methodological descriptions and their results graphs to generalize their projection approach mathematically as follows (using our own notation):
The variable Cj is Bitcoin's global CO2 emissions quantity in future year j (g CO2e). T2017 is the total number of global cashless transactions in 2017 (314.2 billion), which the authors assume will remain constant for all future years j. The variable fj is the authors' assumed fraction of global cashless transactions attributable to Bitcoin in year j. Ĉ2017 is Bitcoin's average per-transaction carbon emissions intensity (g CO2e/transaction) associated with solving all blocks in 2017.
We note that the authors calculate Cj each year by randomly selecting combinations of blocks that had already been solved in their estimation of 2017 Bitcoin CO2 emissions (as described in Section I) until total Bitcoin transactions in year j are fulfilled. This procedure is repeated 1,000 times. This approach effectively delivers an expected per-transaction CO2 intensity in each year j that is very similar to the simple quotient of 2017 expected carbon emissions (69 Mt CO2e) and 2017 total Bitcoin transactions (103.7 million). This quotient has a value of Ĉ2017 = 665 kg CO2e/trans (181 kg C/trans).
Therefore, we use this constant Ĉ2017 value for analytical efficiency in our results replication, given that the authors use transactions as their future emissions driver (i.e., activity variable) in Eq. 2. In doing so, we arrive at very similar CO2 emission projections to those of the authors, as discussed below.
The authors construct three different scenarios for fj, which they provide over a 100-year projection period, based on their adoption rate analysis of 40 different "broadly adopted" technologies. Our replication of the authors' Bitcoin CO2 emissions projections, which were generated using Eqs. (1) and (2) and the authors' values for fj, are shown in Supplementary Fig. 1 .
Before comparing our replicated results to those of the authors, three caveats are required:
1. The authors' lack of transparency prevents precise comparisons. The authors did not provide their numerical projection results; instead, they only provided one projection results figure with coarse axis scales (their Fig. 1c ). This lack of transparency makes exact replication impossible. Therefore, we checked the general accuracy of our replication by comparing our results to their Figure 1c and to the number of years stated by the authors until cumulative Bitcoin CO2 emissions would exceed 231.4 Gt C (the authors' lower 2 C warming threshold).
2. The authors' base year, and its associated cumulative CO2 emissions, are unclear. Without explanation or explicit acknowledgement, the authors appear to have chosen 2020 as the base
year for projections in their Fig. 1c , even though they had earlier estimated 2017 Bitcoin CO2 emissions. Furthermore, and again without explanation, the authors appear to have assumed a cumulative global anthropogenic CO2 emissions value of around 585 Gt C in 2020 (which we estimated via direct measurement of Fig. 1c ), to which they cumulatively add projected Bitcoin CO2 emissions over time in each scenario. Yet, in their paper, the authors also state that cumulative global anthropogenic carbon emissions had already reached 584.4 Gt C in 2014, six years earlier. This is a glaring analytical inconsistency that we could not reconcile when replicating the authors' projections.
3. The authors' Bitcoin adoption values are opaquely labeled and incongruous. We encountered several difficulties interpreting the authors' data for Bitcoin adoption (fj), which they provided in a downloadable file for three different scenarios: median, lower25, and upper75. These three scenarios are represented in the paper as typical, slow, and fast adoption pathways, respectively. The authors label the year of each adoption value (fj) ordinally, starting with a value of 2, while their emissions projection results are labeled by calendar year starting in 2020. 
III. Replication of Bitcoin adoption scenarios
To better understand the basis for the authors' steep growth trajectories in all three scenarios they considered, we also replicated their derivation of Bitcoin adoption values in each scenario based on their stated comparison to 40 "broadly adopted" technologies. To do so, we obtained the same source data used by the authors 1,2 and replicated their comparative analysis, first by normalizing all adoption data in the same manner as the authors, then by constructing regression curves for the median, 25 th percentile, and 75 th percentile of the technology adoption ranges each year. Our replicated median, lower25, and upper75 adoption curves are shown in Supplementary Fig. 2 , which are in close agreement with those of the authors in their Fig 1b ( repeated below for convenience).
Our replication also revealed a likely error in the authors' representation of data contained in their Fig.  1b . Namely, the rapidly rising trendline labeled "credit card" appears to be based on adoption data for debit cards in the original source 2 , not credit cards.
This error is notable, in that many readers of the Mora et al. paper may look to credit cards as the most appealing comparison product among the 40 in the authors' pool-given that early credit cards represented a disruptive new transaction technology-and form opinions about Bitcoin's future adoption potential on this basis. However, credit card usage in the United States followed a more gradual adoption path than that shown in the authors' Fig. 1b . Specifically, the first universal U.S. credit card (Diner's Club) was introduced in 1950 3 and by 1970 (20 years later) the fraction of U.S. families holding credit cards had risen to 50% 4 , whereas the authors' (mislabeled) adoption curve implies that credit cards grew much faster, penetrating around 80% of U.S. households in a similar time period. Next, we discuss two major study design flaws that became apparent to us during the process of replicating Mora et al.'s methods and results.
IV. The use of transactions as an energy demand driver is questionable
As summarized in Eq. 2, the authors project Bitcoin's future CO2 emissions in each scenario using transactions as the emissions driver-i.e., the activity variable-in all future years. We consider this approach as a fundamental study design flaw, since it is well known that the electricity consumed, and hence the CO2 emitted, by Bitcoin mining does not depend on the number of transactions but, rather, on the difficulty and number of blocks mined. 5, 6, 7 The pace at which blocks are mined is kept constant at around 6 blocks per hour. The difficulty parameter in the mining algorithm is adjusted every 14 days to maintain this pace. An increasing number of transactions will therefore not cause an increase in the number of blocks. Instead, this will cause that individual blocks will include more transactions. The effort to mine a block is however independent of the number of transactions in the block.
Indeed, the authors themselves calculate 2017 Bitcoin energy use and emissions based on block difficulty, not number of transactions (Eq. 1). Without explanation or justification, the authors switch to transactions as the driver for projecting emissions in all future years, undermining the consistency of their calculations and the integrity of their projections.
To illustrate this flaw, let's assume that all 314.2 billion cashless transactions in 2017 would be Bitcoin transactions. Then in the authors' approach this takes about 159 million blocks (considering that one block contained on average about 1,974 transactions in 2017). 8 This implies mining at a pace of 18,170 blocks per hour-three orders of magnitude greater than the established fixed pace of 6 blocks per hour-which betrays a lack of understanding of how real-world mining works. In contrast, in the above example, transactions would be increased on average to 5,977,930 per block, keeping the pace nearly constant at 6 blocks mined per hour. Hence, blocks will become much larger, which will cause scalability issues, mainly in communication latency, but it would not necessarily increase mining effort.
V. The authors' Bitcoin adoption scenarios are implausible
As evident in Eq. (2), the authors' future Bitcoin CO2 emissions estimates are sensitive to their design of adoption scenarios (fi). The authors' typical, slow, and fast adoption scenarios are plotted in Supplementary Fig 1b, which paints a seemingly unavoidable future of sudden and rapid Bitcoin adoption. Mathematically, the authors' use of steep logarithmic growth curves in all scenarios can only result (see Eq. 2) in large near-term increases in Bitcoin's carbon emissions, even in the slowest adoption scenario.
The authors implicitly justify steep future growth by pointing to rapid historical (2009-2017) growth in global Bitcoin transactions (the authors' Supplementary Figure 1 ), which they model using a power function. However, 2018 data (most of which were available prior to publication of the authors' study) expose the well-documented danger of simply extrapolating past trends into the future: global Bitcoin transactions fell by 22% in 2018 9 . Therefore, in 2018, as shown in Supplementary Fig. 3 , the authors' power model already overestimates global Bitcoin transactions by a factor of 2. This discrepancy underscores why readers should be wary of any future energy/carbon emission projections based on simple extrapolation of early rapid growth trends, especially for information technology (IT) systems, whose efficiencies and service demands can evolve quickly. 10, 11, 12 Supplementary Upon initial observation, the steep upward slope of the authors' historical power model ( Supplementary  Fig. 3 ) might seem visually coherent with the steep initial upward slopes of the authors' future adoption scenarios (authors' Fig 1b) . However, when these data series are plotted together on the same scalei.e., billions of transactions-major inconsistencies emerge. As shown in Supplementary Fig. 4 , the authors' own historical power model follows a much flatter future trajectory in the near-term compared to the Bitcoin transactions assumed by the authors in their scenarios, all three of which abruptly switch to significantly steeper trajectories at their outsets.
Supplementary Figure 4. Comparison of historical (2009-2017) Bitcoin transactions and the future Bitcoin transactions associated with the authors' power model and their three adoption scenarios.
Note: Due to negative initial values and missing data for 2018 (see Section II), the authors' three scenarios have different start years and are represented here with different styles than in previous graphs for clarity.
Moreover, in the first year of each of the authors' scenarios, implausibly massive jumps in Bitcoin transactions would be required to bridge the gaps compared to present-day totals. In 2017, global Bitcoin transactions totaled 104 million, or a mere 0.03% of global cashless transactions. 13 In the authors' scenarios, however, the following must happen:
 by 2019 (i.e., only 2 years later), Bitcoin adoption must jump to: o 78 billion transactions in the fast scenario, which represents a:  750x increase compared to 2017, and a  280x increase compared to their power model extrapolated to 2019  by 2020 (3 years later), Bitcoin adoption must jump to: o 11 billion transactions in the median scenario, which represents a:
 108x increase compared to 2017, and a  29x increase compared to their power model extrapolated to 2020  By 2023 (5 years later), Bitcoin adoption must jump to: o 8 billion transactions in the slow scenario, which represents a:  76x increase compared to 2017  9x increase compared to their power model extrapolated to 2023
The authors do not address the above numerical disconnects that exist between present-day Bitcoin transactions, those implied by their power model, and those required in the first years of each future scenario. Nor do the authors justify the plausibility of the very abrupt changes in adoption trajectories and transaction levels associated with their scenarios. Implicitly, the authors require the reader to "suspend disbelief" in accepting scenarios that are numerically inconsistent and historically implausible, yet they provide no evidence why one should do so.
We find these implausible scenarios to be another fundamental study design flaw.
VI. Use of outdated mining rig efficiency and grid carbon intensity values
When replicating the authors' 2017 Bitcoin energy use and CO2 emissions estimate (see Section I), we found that they applied outdated values for mining rig efficiencies and electric power carbon intensities, which inflated their 2017 energy and emissions results considerably.
When estimating the direct electricity use of Bitcoin mining, the authors erroneously included many old and inefficient rigs in their selection pool that were no longer economically viable in 2017, betraying a lack of understanding of current mining equipment and economics. Supplementary Table 1 lists the pool of mining rigs constructed by the authors, from which they randomly assigned rigs (i.e., with equal probability) to solve blocks in 2017 via Eq. 1. The authors claim they have included "only hardware that is economically profitable by modern standards;" 13 however, they offer no explicit definition of what they mean by "economically profitable" or "modern standards."
Here we demonstrate that the authors included in their pool many old, computationally-slow, and energy-inefficient rigs that had little chance of being "economically profitable" in 2017. To aid in our assessment, we first compiled best available estimates of the release date for each of the 62 models in the authors' mining rig pool. Our estimated release dates are shown in Supplementary Table 1 , which indicates that the authors included models released as early as January 2013, or five years prior to the end of the authors' reference year (2017).
Next, we compiled historical data on the number of daily blocks solved, their associated difficulty levels, the Bitcoin award per solved block, the transaction fees collected, and the average Bitcoin market value for the period 1-Jan-2013 to 30-Nov-2018. 8, 14 Using these historical data, we then computed the nominal value of daily mined blocks as follows:
The variable Vk is the total value of blocks mined in day k (nominal USD $), Nk is the number of blocks mined that day, Tk is daily average transaction fee (BTC/block), Bk is the daily mining reward (BTC/block), and Mk is the daily average Bitcoin market value ($/BTC). Next, for each of the 62 rigs in the authors' selection pool, we calculated the electricity use that would 3 be necessary if that rig were assigned to solve the blocks in each day k, following the mathematical 4 approach in Eq. 1. Finally, we divided the nominal mined block value (Vk) by the electricity use that 5 would have been required for a given rig to solve those blocks (kWh), and did so for all days in our 6 analysis period. 7 Supplementary Fig. 5 plots our computed nominal mined block value per kWh expended ($/kWh) for all 8 62 rigs. This metric expresses the maximum mining value that could be extracted per kWh expended 9 during mining; when operating costs per kWh expended ($/kWh) exceed this value, mining cannot be 10 profitable. Operating costs include the costs of electricity, equipment depreciation, labor, and other 11 costs incurred during mining. While empirical data on operating costs are scarce, several published 12 estimates suggest that $0.05/kWh is a reasonable current minimum value, with electricity typically 13
Supplementary
comprising the largest share of operating costs. 7,15 14 In Supplementary Fig. 5 , we color code rigs of different efficiency classes, indicate the numbers of rigs 15 that fall into each class in the authors' selection pool, and start each rig's data series on its estimated 16 release date. We also indicate the typical $0.05/kWh threshold on the plot; rigs whose data series fall 17 below this threshold in a given time period would not be considered profitable, because nominal mined 18 block value earned per kWh expended would not exceed operating costs. 19
It can be seen that many of the older, less energy-efficient rigs that were included in the authors' 20 selection pool-while profitable when first introduced several years ago-by 2017 would be profitable 21 only at implausibly low operating cost levels. For example, in 2017, many of the lowest efficiency rigs 22 included by the authors (i.e., the blue-shaded rigs with efficiencies less than 0.3 GH/J) could have only 23 been profitable with operating costs less than $0.01/kWh, which is much lower than even the cheapest 24
documented rates for mining electricity costs alone. 15,16,17 25 In other words, many of the rigs included in the authors' selection pool were not "economically 26 profitable by modern standards" in the authors' own reference year (2017), and should, therefore, have 27 been excluded from their analysis. In Supplementary Fig. 6 , we plot the effects of excluding old, energy-28 efficient rigs from our replicated analysis at different assumed levels of operating cost. For each 29 monthly period in 2017, we reran our original replication but excluded any rigs from the selection pool 30 that would not have been profitable at various operating cost levels. We summed these monthly results 31 to arrive at total direct Bitcoin electricity use estimates in 2017. 32
It is clear from Supplementary Fig. 6 which include only the newer, faster, and more energy-efficient rigs that were likely to be profitable in 41 2017. [5] [6] [7] Indeed, looking at Supplementary Fig. 6 from left to right, one can clearly see how, as rigs get 42 older, they are invariably pushed out of profitability as newer, more efficient rigs emerge. 43 during the intervening years ( Supplementary Fig 7) . This was done even though sufficient data existed at 7
the time of their study for reasonable estimates of 2017 carbon intensities. 18, 19, 20 Supplementary Fig. 7  8 plots the location-weighted average grid CO2 emissions intensity from 2000-2016 (historical), with 9
forward-projections from 2017 to 2060 from the IEA's central outlook (based on current and announced 10 national policies in assumed mining locations). From this figure, it's clear that, by using 2014 carbon 11
intensities, the authors arrived at a higher 2017 CO2 emissions value than if they had used available data 12
for 2017 carbon intensities. 13
To assess the effects of the authors' use of outdated rig efficiencies and grid carbon intensities, we 14 applied Fig. 6 ). We then multiplied this value by a location-weighted carbon intensity that was 19 9% lower than the authors' 2014 value, to capture the technological progress that occurred between 20 2014 and 2017 ( Supplementary Fig. 7) . We arrived at a 2017 Bitcoin CO2 emissions estimate of 15.7 21
MtCO2e, which is far lower than the authors' original estimate of 69 MtCO2e. 22
Therefore, we determined that, had the authors not erroneously included outdated rig efficiencies and 23 grid scenario. This was done by sampling solved blocks from their 2017 analysis until the required 38 transactions in each future year were fulfilled. In other words, they did not vary the mining rig pool 39 options in future years; for example, the pool of rigs they used to solve blocks in 2050 was the same 40 pool of rigs they used to solve blocks in 2017. Moreover, the authors state explicitly that they did not 41
consider any changes over time to the power grids in each assumed mining location. These decisions 42 effectively held both mining rig efficiencies and grid carbon intensities constant for the next 100 years. 43
This dubious choice ignores the dynamic natures of mining rig and power grid technologies and violates 44 the widely-followed practice of accounting for technological change in forward-looking energy 45 technology scenarios. 46
Estimating the future energy efficiency of mining is certainly difficult, but the authors never explain why 47 they simply ignored this important scenario consideration, nor do they justify how assuming static 48 mining efficiencies for 100 years-when, historically, mining rigs have evolved monthly with respect to 49 their hashrates and energy efficiencies-can lead to any useful insights. And, in acknowledging their 50 static grid intensities assumption, they point to at least one available reference containing credible grid 51
intensity outlooks, 20 but failed to utilize these data. The fallacy in keeping grid carbon intensities 52 constant at 2014 levels can clearly be seen in Supplementary Fig. 7 , which shows a widening gulf over 53 time between the authors' static assumption (in red) and that of the prevailing outlook (the IEA's ETP 54
2017 Reference Technology Scenario, in green) for the authors' assumed mining locations. 55
We consider the authors' decisions to hold both mining rig efficiencies and grid carbon intensities 56 constant to be fatal flaws of their analysis, and conspicuously out of step with established best practices 57
for IT energy analysis and long-term energy scenario modeling. 21 And, because the authors significantly 58 overestimated 2017 Bitcoin energy use and CO2 emissions by using outdated rig and carbon intensity 59
data, it follows that their decision to lock in these 2017 values in all future years led to inflated CO2 60 emissions projections as well. 61 Therefore, we assessed how the authors' own model would have yielded different results had they: (a) 62 at least excluded unprofitable rigs from their 2017 pool; and (b) used available data sources to account 63 for projected changes in grid carbon intensities in their assumed mining locations. We applied our 64 replicated model to first generate scenarios assuming 2017 CO2 emissions of 15.7 MtCO2e (based on a 65 global average minimum operating cost of $0.05/kWh, as discussed in Section VI), as shown in 66 Supplementary Fig. 9b . To these results, we then applied changes in the location-weighted grid carbon 67
intensity from 2017 to 2060, using available data from the IEA's central outlook based on current and 68 announced national policies in each mining location ( Supplementary Fig. 9c ). 69
The results show that, had the authors applied more reasonable values in their analysis-even 70 maintaining the flawed assumption of holding 2017 mining rig efficiencies constant, but at more 71 economically plausible levels-their own model would have delivered much different projections 72 compared to their original results. 73
VIII. Improper execution of the 40-product comparison analysis 74
Lastly, our replication of the authors' 40 technology comparison (see Section III) revealed errors that 75 biased their results in favor of steep initial growth trajectories. While the scientific community may be 76 justified in questioning the authors' comparison of Bitcoin to a seemingly arbitrary mix of technologies 77 that vary widely in their social utility, here we focus only on errors committed by the authors executing 78 their own stated methods. 79
In constructing their scenarios, the authors state that "the first year of usage for each technology was 80 set to one, to allow comparison of trends among technologies," which is the approach we followed in 81 our replicated analysis ( Supplementary Fig. 2 ). For each technology, the authors equated "first year of 82 usage" with "first year since introduction," as evident in their Fig 1b. However, in our replicated 83
